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Abstract
"The primary components of this decision depend on both a narrative of continuity and change."
Posting about the Supreme Court ruling on same-sex marriage from In All Things - an online hub
committed to the claim that the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ has implications for the entire
world.
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A Summary and Initial Response to the Same-Sex
Marriage Ruling
inallthings.org /a-summary-and-initial-response-to-the-same-sex-marriage-ruling/
Donald Roth
Yesterday’s decision upholding the Affordable Care Act (see my summary and analysis here) was an
important win for the Obama Administration, but it will likely be completely overshadowed by today’s
decision in Obergefell v Hodges, the case which has legalized same-sex marriage across the United
States. Unlike yesterday’s case, the issues in this one are fairly straightforward: same-sex couples wish to
marry or have their marriages recognized in states which currently do not recognize such unions; does the
Constitution require this recognition? The answer, by an unsurprising 5-4 margin, was a resounding “yes.”
While the issues aren’t as complicated this time, the case is much longer, but never fear, I’ve boiled down
the 103 pages of text into a roughly two-page summary for you, and I’ll offer some brief thoughts and
responses at the end.
The Decision
The primary components of this decision depend on both a narrative of continuity and change. The
majority says that marriage has always been a fundamental institution in society, but it also says that what
exactly that institution looks like has been the subject of ongoing change and evolution.
The Court’s change argument looks to past practices, saying that marriage was once a matter of parental
negotiation over various political, religious, and financial concerns. This evolved into a view of marriage as
a “single, male-dominated legal entity” which was abandoned when “society began to understand that
women have their own equal dignity.” Citing a line of legal developments seeing a similar increase in the
recognition of the dignity of homosexuals, the majority sees the availability of marriage to these individuals
as a logical next step. Reviewing the evolution of marriage, Kennedy asserts that “[t]hese new insights
have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage,” and it’s clear from his opinion that he sees
the expansion into same-sex marriage in much the same light.
After placing marriage in a context of cultural change and evolution, Kennedy reaffirms the centrality and
fundamental nature of marriage within our legal system. He cites significant legal history upholding
marriage as a fundamental right, saying that these were a reflection of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of protection from deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” He goes
on to define liberty as extending “to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”
Kennedy specifically enumerates four reasons why marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution,
and he explains that each of these four reasons applies with equal force to same-sex couples:
1. “[T]he right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”
The majority draws language directly from precedent in cases like Loving v. Virginia, which said the
freedom to marry “resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”
2. Marriage “supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals.” This argument is tied into the first, seeing marriage as a way for people to define their
identities by reference to their commitment to another person.

3. Marriage “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education.” The majority’s primary argument here is that current
marriage laws “harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.”
4. “Marriage is a keystone of our social order.” Kennedy cites the 1888 decision of Maynard v. Hill,
saying “marriage is ‘the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.’” He then mentions that this sentiment “has been reiterated even as the
institution has evolved in substantial ways over time.” However, Kennedy’s primary argument on
this point seems to be that marriage, as central to the social order, carries with it a wide variety of
legal and material benefits, which it is unfair to deny to same-sex couples.
In addition to this summary of the primary reasoning, two other significant issues should be pointed out.
First, the opinion goes seemingly out of its way to make sure that it does not announce a specific standard
of scrutiny applicable to orientation-based discrimination.1 Second, the opinion does say “it must be
emphasized that religions … may continue to advocate with the utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine
precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.”
The Dissents
Not surprising many who have followed this issue, the Court’s four more traditionally conservative justices 2
dissented from this opinion. Chief Justice Roberts’ primary concern was that the majority removed the
question of same sex marriage from the democratic process based more on personal feeling than
Constitutional principle, and he condemns the Court for taking the “extraordinary step of ordering every
State to license and recognize same-sex marriage,” saying, “Many people will rejoice at this decision, and I
begrudge none their celebration. But for those who believe in a government of laws, not of men, the
majority’s approach is deeply disheartening.” Roberts sees the “union of a man and a woman” as a
fundamental characteristic of marriage in a way that none of the changes mentioned by the majority
affected, and he argues that things like “[r]emoving racial barriers to marriage … did not change what a
marriage was any more than integrating schools changed what a school was.”
Roberts’ dissent also goes on to strongly criticize the grounds of the majority’s conclusion, comparing it
extensively to the infamous Lochner v. New York 3 decision on the grounds that Kennedy’s definition of
liberty reflects more of a personal philosophy than a legal judgment: “Ultimately, only one precedent offers
any support for the majority’s methodology: Lochner v. New York. The majority opens its opinion by
announcing petitioners’ right to ‘define and express their identity.’ The majority later explains that ‘the right
to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.’ This freewheeling notion of individual autonomy echoes nothing so much as “the general right of an individual to be
free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor [citing Lochner].”4
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito also dissented. Scalia emphasized his concerns with removing the
same-sex marriage question from the democratic process. Thomas criticized Kennedy’s definition of
personal dignity as being something granted by the government, rather than inherent to a person, saying
that the Constitutional guarantee of liberty is about a freedom from restraint, not a guarantee of entitlement
to benefits. Finally, Alito reinforces all three of the other dissents, adding in some of his own historical
analysis of what the Constitution does and does not protect.
The Implications
This article has already gotten too long for a more searching analysis of this case, which may come at a
later time, but it’s important to make a few observations on the practical import of this case and to pose
some of the very important questions that this case raises which might help guide your own analysis.

As a matter of practical implication, it’s obvious that this case means that same-sex couples across the
country can now marry; however, as noted, this case explicitly avoids resolving the question regarding
orientation-based classifications. The majority does seek to placate these concerns a little, but most of the
dissents raise the question of what this line of cases means for things like religious schools who seek to
offer married housing only to heterosexual couples and the fundamental question of whether private
organizations who oppose same-sex marriage can maintain their tax exemption, something even the
Solicitor General5 said will be an issue after this decision. So, in many ways, the pebble has dropped in
the pond, and we’re waiting to see what the ripples will be.
Finally, however, I want frame up a couple of questions that might help the Christian community wrestle
with their response to this decision and to spur discussion of these issues in the coming days and weeks.
1. What do you think marriage is?
This question may seem obvious, but I would encourage you to read again over the basic contours of
Kennedy’s argument. What do you agree with there? What do you have a problem with? For me, I see a
lot that I agree with, particularly in his 2nd-4 th propositions about the fundamental nature of marriage, but I
have issues with other areas. At the same time, in oral arguments, Justice Ginsburg said that “traditional
marriage” was done away with long ago when we stopped viewing women as property. What about that
statement rings true and/or false?
2. What are the essential characteristics of our humanity?
This may seem like a daunting question to wrestle with, but anthropology (philosophy of man) is absolutely
crucial to this case. As I’ve mentioned before, Kennedy has a very particular view of what personhood is.
As he6 said all the way back in Planned Parentood v. Casey, “At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.” Does the first sentence “define the attributes of personhood” for Christians? Is there a
difference in how we answer this as a church versus how we would answer this as a civil society?
3. What does it mean to be free?
Central to Kennedy’s conception of personhood is this idea of personal autonomy. He says that to be full
persons, we must be free to essentially construct our reality. In this case, he says, “Under the Constitution,
same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would
disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.” Are we dehumanized when
we do not possess a full menu of options regarding how we wish to live and conceive of our lives? In some
ways, it sounds like any rule but “everyone does what is right in their own eyes” does affirmative harm to
the people being ruled. How do we wrestle with/respond to that as Christians?
4. What is the best balance of being “ruled by laws or men”?
This is an issue I framed up in my summary and analysis of the Affordable Care Act decision handed down
yesterday, but it’s a concern raised explicitly by the dissenting judges. Whether you think that this concern
applies to this case or not, the question remains vital to civil society. It’s undeniable that reality involves a
bit of both, since the administration of the law involves some interpretation and latitude in enforcement;7
however, what should that balance look like? Based on this case, what sort of questions should be left up
to the democratic process, and when should the judiciary step in?
There are many more questions that could be asked, but hopefully this spurs some reflection. What do you
think?

Footnotes
1. One of the hottest issues surrounding this issue is whether distinctions made on the basis of
orientation would be viewed as legally suspect and therefore subject to more careful review. The
most careful review available is “strict scrutiny,” which applies to racial classifications, while gender
and legitimacy are subject to a slightly lower standard of “intermediate scrutiny,” and everything else
gets “rational basis review.” The golden issue in this is if orientation-based classifications received
strict scrutiny, which might unlock a significant body of precedent for the exceptional legal efforts
permitted to reverse the stain of formal institutional racism. ↩
2. That is, John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. ↩
3. Lochner and a variety of related cases put up substantial barriers to economic reforms of the early
20 th Century on the basis of a perceived “freedom to contract.” This included overturning laws
against child labor, protecting worker safety, and many other labor issues. This line of jurisprudence
was radically abandoned in the 1930s, at least partly under the threat from the president to pack the
court with his own nominees by adding a seat for every justice over 70. This is known as the “switch
in time that saved nine.” ↩
4. Citations have been removed from this quotation. ↩
5. That is, the chief lawyer representing the United States, who in this case was arguing in favor of
same-sex marriage. ↩
6. As pointed out to me by a friend of mine, I incorrectly attributed this statement to O’Connor in my
initial article, when Kennedy is almost certainly the author of this particular statement. ↩
7. For example, while the law may say the speed limit is 55, if the police won’t pull you over unless
you’re going over 60, the functional law is actually a speed limit of about 60. This means that the
administrative enforcement of the law actually changes what the law is, but, since we anchor
enforcement to the statute itself, we don’t talk about the law as if the speed limit were 60 mph. ↩

